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Abstract. Deborah Mayo claims to have refuted Birnbaum’s argument
that the Likelihood Principle is a logical consequence of the Sufficiency
and Conditionality Principles. However, this claim fails because her
interpretation of the Conditionality Principle is different from Birn-
baum’s. Birnbaum’s proof cannot be so readily dismissed.
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Deborah Mayo (2014) is not the first devoutly to
wish that the (strong) Likelihood Principle [princi-
ple L of Birnbaum (1962)] was not a logical conse-
quence of the Sufficiency Principle (Birnbaum’s S)
and the Conditionality Principle (Birnbaum’s C).
This concern arises because much of frequentist in-
ference is in clear violation of L, while at the same
time purporting to abide by S and C. This con-
stitutes a self-contradiction, which frequentists are,
however, loth to admit. Birnbaum himself appears
to have been quite distraught at his own finding, and
in the half-century since publication of his argument
there has been a constant trickle of attempts to come
to terms with it, including one or two of my own
(Dawid (1977); Dawid (1983); Dawid (1987); Dawid
(2011)); a detailed account that I consider displays
the underlying logic clearly can be found in Chapter
II “Principles of Inference” of Dawid (2013).
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Those who feel disquiet at the destructive im-
plications of Birnbaum’s theorem for their favored
method of inference (be it frequentist or, for ex-
ample, “objective Bayesian,” which also violates L)
have a number of strategies to try and ease that
disquiet. If they accept the validity of the theorem,
they might argue [along with Fraser (1963); Durbin
(1970); Kalbfleisch (1975)] that S or C should not
be taken as universally applicable—thus evading
the consequent of the theorem by denying its an-
tecedents. This is at least a logically sound ploy, al-
though it reeks of adhockery. Also, the ploy may not
be totally successful, since some of the “undesirable”
implications of the theorem may survive weakening
of its hypotheses: Dawid (1987) suggests that the
principle of the irrelevance of the stopping rule is
one such survivor.
A second possible strategy is to fully accept S and
C and Birnbaum’s argument—and thereby come to
accept L. This is the path of enlightenment followed
by conversion.
The third strategy involves accepting S and C,
but still rejecting L. If that is your motivation (and
you care about self-consistency), you have no op-
tion but to try and find fault with the logic of Birn-
baum’s theorem. This is Mayo’s strategy. The only
problem is that Birnbaum’s theorem is indeed logi-
cally sound. That means that Mayo’s attempt to ar-
gue the contrary must itself be unsound. Although
there are many points at which I am deeply critical
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of her argument, I will content myself with drawing
attention to her principal misunderstanding, which
vitiates her entire enterprise: she simply has not
grasped Birnbaum’s conditionality principle C, con-
flating and confusing it with Cox’s WCP, which is
quite different.
According to Mayo, WCP requires that “one
should condition on the known experiment,” or (as
she phrases it in Section 4.3) “eschew unconditional
formulations.” But Birnbaum describes his principle
C as the requirement that
the evidential meaning of any outcome of
any mixture experiment is the same as
that of the corresponding outcome of the
corresponding component experiment, ig-
noring the over-all structure of the mix-
ture experiment.
That is, Birnbaum’s principle C requires identity of
the inferences to be drawn (from the same data)
in different circumstances. This imposes an equiva-
lence relationship across such circumstances. Prin-
ciple C has nothing to say about the form or nature
of the inferences, and—importantly—unlike WCP
is entirely nondirectional. Mayo has misconstrued it
as synonymous with WCP, which would require that
we should discard whatever inference we might have
been contemplating in the mixture experiment and
replace it by our favored inference in the component
experiment. However, an equally (in)valid reading
of C would be the contrary: that we should discard
a contemplated component-experiment inference in
favor of an inference formed for the mixture exper-
iment. In fact, neither of these interpretations has
anything to do with principle C and, typically—as
indeed follows from Birnbaum’s theorem and the
fact that frequentist inference violates C—neither
of them can be implemented consistently within a
frequentist framework.
In her Section 4.3.3 Mayo does consider the rela-
tionship between WCP and equivalence principles,
and quite correctly decides that WCP is not one of
these. In Section 7 she opines, “The problem stems
from mistaking WCP as the equivalence. . . .” So at
least she realises that WCP and Birnbaum’s princi-
ple C are different. However the “problem” is just
the contrary: she has mistaken Birnbaum’s equiva-
lence requirement C as the “nonequivalence” prin-
ciple WCP.
Mayo has attempted to argue that L does not fol-
low from S and WCP. Notwithstanding the short-
falls in her arguments, I agree with that conclusion.
The trouble is, it has nothing to do with Birnbaum’s
theorem. Mayo has been attacking a straw man, and
Birnbaum’s result, S & C ⇒ L, remains entirely un-
touched by her criticisms.
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